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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Micky Lee Whitcomb appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief and denying his 
motion for appointment of counsel. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The statement of facts of the underlying criminal case are set forth in State 
v. Whitcomb, Docket No. 21966, 1995 Unpublished Opinion No. 632 (Idaho App., 
December 22, 1995): 
Micky Lee Whitcomb pleaded guilty to second degree 
murder and assault with intent to murder. These pleas were made 
in response to allegations that Whitcomb killed Sharon Webb by 
shooting her in the face at point-blank range with a high powered 
hunting rifle and that he then turned n on Webb's thirteen-
year-old son and fired again. however, was not hit. 
The district court sentenced Whitcomb eterminate life term for 
second degree murder and a consecutive fourteen-year 
determinate term for assault with intent to murder. Whitcomb did 
not appeal the judgment of conviction or sentences. Whitcomb did, 
however, file a timely motion under I.C.R. 35 for reconsideration of 
his sentences. Following a hearing, the motion was denied. 
Whitcomb, at 1. Whitcomb appealed from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, 
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. gl 
Six years later, in 2001, Whitcomb filed an application for post-conviction 
relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Whitcomb v. State, 
Docket No. 27697, 2002 Unpublished Opinion No. 711 (Idaho App., August 21, 
2002). The district court dismissed the petition as untimely and as raising issues 
that could have been raised on direct appeal. gl at 1. The district court's order 
1 
was affirmed on appeal. kl In 2007, Whitcomb filed a second Rule 35 motion. 
State v. Whitcomb, Docket No. 34139, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 338 (Idaho 
App., Jan. 24, 2008). The district court denied the motion, ruling it was an 
improper attack on the validity of Whitcomb's underlying conviction, and the 
court's order was affirmed on appeal. kl 
Finally, in 2011, Whitcomb filed a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief and motion for appointment of counsel, which are the subjects of this 
appeal. (R., pp. 2-10.) In his petition he alleged that his attorney was ineffective 
for failing to directly appeal his sentence. (R., p. 4.) In his supporting affidavit, 
Whitcomb claimed that he sent his attorney a letter asking her to directly appeal 
his sentence but that she failed to do so. (R., p. 20-22.) He attached a copy of 
the letter to his petition. (R., p. 19.) Whitcomb explained that he was unable to 
previously include the letter because he believed that his copy of the letter had 
been lost, but that it had now been re-discovered. (R., pp. 20-22.) 
The district court denied Whitcomb's motion for counsel and filed a notice 
of its intention to dismiss Whitcomb's petition. (R., pp. 34-39.) It explained that 
Whitcomb's claim was identical to that made in his first petition for post-
conviction relief, that it was time-barred, and that the post-conviction proceeding 
was not one "that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to 
bring" at his own expense. (R., pp. 37-39.) Whitcomb responded to the notice of 
intent to dismiss and renewed his request for appointment of counsel. (R., pp. 
40-43.) The district court thereafter dismissed Whitcomb's petition for the 
reasons set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp. 44-45.) Whitcomb 
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timely appealed and requested appointment of appellate counsel. (R., pp. 48-52, 




Whitcomb states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Appellant is entitled to counsel to address the issues that 
could have been addressed in appeals, post-convictions, and the 
District Court abused his discretion in not appointing counsel. 
2. Using the threat of the chair to coerse [sic] the Appellant into 
pleading guilty by both counsel and the prosecutor, especially when 
they knew there was no intent to commit murder in the 1st degree, 
an element of 1st Degree Murder. 
3. Appellant is entitled to bring issues to this court since 
counsel's negligence to persue [sic] and preserve issues presented 
herein. 
4. The Time Bar doesn't apply to successive post-conviction 
relief petitions. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6 (emphasis in original).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Whitcomb failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief and the denial of his request for counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Whitcomb Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition And Denying His Request 
For Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Whitcomb challenges the district court's dismissal of his successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) He also challenges the 
district court's denial of his request for appointment of counsel. (Id.) Whitcomb 
has failed to show error. 
B. Standard Of Review And Legal Standards Applicable To A District Court's 
Decision To Grant Or Deny A Request For The Appointment Of Counsel 
In Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789,792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 
682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not 
unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
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the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 
P. 3d at 1111 . 1 
1 A post-conviction claim is properly dismissed if the petitioner fails to present 
evidence sufficient to show a material issue of fact on which relief can be 
granted. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522-23, 164 P.3d 798, 802-03 
(2007). Because this is a higher burden than demonstrating the possibility of a 
valid claim necessitating the appointment of counsel, Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 
22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 345, 223 
P.3d 281, 287 (2009), the remainder of this section of the Respondent's brief will 
focus on the "possibility of a valid claim" standard on the assumption that if 
Whitcomb did not show entitlement to counsel the dismissal of his claim is 
proper, but that if he did show entitlement to counsel then dismissal without the 
opportunity of counsel to appear was error. 
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C. Whitcomb Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For 
The Appointment Of Counsel To Pursue The Frivolous Claims Alleged In 
His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
Whitcomb has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
request for counsel because, as found by the district court, Whitcomb's petition 
was frivolous. (R., p. 37.) The petition was time-barred and was also an 
improper successive petition and, as such, failed to raise even the possibility of a 
valid claim. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." In the 
case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid 
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims 
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise 
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874). In 
those circumstances, the court will apply a "reasonable time" standard. 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. "In determining what a 
reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply consider 
it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 
144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. However, absent a showing by the petitioner 
that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for 
post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 
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247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); 
Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190,219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The claim presented in Whitcomb 1s successive petition, filed March 8, 
2011 (R., p. 2), was filed beyond one year after his judgment became final in his 
underlying criminal case; Whitcomb filed his successive petition approximately 1 O 
years after he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief and at least 15 years 
after he was sentenced. (R., pp. 12, 20.) Whitcomb has not argued that his 
claim was not known to him or could not have reasonably been known within the 
requisite time-frame for filing his initial post-conviction petition, nor can he. (See 
Appellant's Brief.) Ineffective assistance of counsel claim are presumed to be 
known when they occur. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 252, 220 P.3d 1066, 
1072 (2009) ("We have repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims can or should be known after trial.") Here, Whitcomb actually knew of 
his claim at least as early as the filing of his first petition. In fact, his claim in his 
successive petition is identical to his claim in his first petition, which the district 
court dismissed as untimely. (R., p. 38 (District court noting that "this is precisely 
the same assertion made on page three of petitioner's original time-barred 
petition in case no. SP 2001-2722.").) Thus, his successive petition was properly 
dismissed on this ground. 
The district court also correctly dismissed the petition on the ground that it 
was an improper successive petition. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act ("UPCPA") provides: "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under 
this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application." I.C. 
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§ 19-4908. A successive petition is allowed only if "the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted [in the successive petition] which for su-fficient reason was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application." I.C. § 19-4908; see also Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 
P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1990); Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P.2d 39, 
41 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Due process requires that a post-conviction petitioner be provided with a 
meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented. Schwartz v. State, 
145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,403 (Ct. App. 2008); Hernandez v. State, 133 
Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999); Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 
381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996). To protect this right, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the prohibition against 
successive petitions for claims that were not known to the petitioner at the time of 
the original post-conviction action. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-05, 174 P.3d 
at 874-75; Stuart, 118 Idaho at 933-34, 801 P.2d at 1284-85. Where the 
petitioner sets forth facts showing the claim upon which the successive petition is 
based was not known to the petitioner until after resolution of the first post-
conviction action, such facts may constitute a sufficient reason entitling the 
petitioner to bring the successive petition. See Stuart, 118 Idaho at 933-34, 801 
P.3d at 874-75 (considering merits of successive petition that set forth facts, with 
accompanying affidavits, alleging newly discovered information not known to 
petitioner at time of filing of first petition). Where, however, the petitioner alleges 
grounds for relief that "were known or should have been known at the time of the 
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first petition," such grounds are "permanently waived" and do not constitute a 
sufficient reason to permit the filing of a successive petition. ht 
On appeal, Whitcomb does not argue that he gave the district court 
"sufficient reason" for not adequately presenting his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in his first petition. However, giving Whitcomb the benefit of the 
doubt and construing the pleadings most favorable to Whitcomb, it appears that 
he may be arguing that the re-discovery of the 1993 letter to his attorney 
constitutes "sufficient reason" for his failure to previously adequately present his 
claim. If this is, in fact, Whitcomb's claim, he has failed to show error. Whitcomb 
knew of the letter's existence (he wrote it) and his attorney's purported failures as 
early as September 1993. (R., pp. 21-22.) Because the existence of this letter 
was known to Whitcomb even well before he filed his first petition, it cannot 
constitute a "sufficient reason" to permit the filing of a successive petition. 
Because Whitcomb has failed to show he raised the possibility of a valid 
claim or a sufficient reason for filing a successive post-conviction petition, he has 
failed to show error in the district court's denial of his request for counsel or the 
summary dismissal of his successive petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Micky L. Whitcomb's successive petition for post-
conviction relief. 
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DATED this 1st day of December 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of December 2011, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
EAK/pm 
MICKY L. WHITCOMB 
IDOC #16983 
381 W. Hospital Drive 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Deputy Attorney General 
11 

